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ABSTRACT 
Complex considerations challenge U.S. political leaders when faced with the possibility 
of humanitarian intervention by means of military force. Humanitarian intervention is a 
delicate matter in which decision makers are constrained or compelled by circumstances 
of national interest and moral imperative. 
This examination of humanitarian intervention reviews the foreign policy context 
and debate within the U.S. government across three case studies: Rwanda, Kosovo, and 
Libya. Each case study reveals the role of national interest and moral imperative in 
driving policymakers to a tipping point at which they make the final determination to use 
or refrain from military force. Both national interest and the desire to end human 
suffering serve as incentives for intervention, and one may be stronger than the other in 
any given situation. 
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Complex considerations challenge political leaders when faced with the 
possibility of humanitarian intervention by means of military force. Humanitarian 
intervention is a delicate matter in which decision makers are constrained or compelled 
by circumstances of national interest and the duty to save innocent lives. Two former 
secretaries of state, Henry Kissinger and James Baker, stated it well in their 2011 
Washington Post article: “Having served four U.S. presidents during a variety of 
international crises, we view the choice between ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’ as a false one. 
Just as ideals must be applied to concrete circumstances, realism requires context for our 
nation’s values to be meaningful.”1   
They are proposing that U.S. foreign policy decisions are always founded upon an 
aspect of national interest and opportunely tied to the values of American society. This 
phenomenon is especially true of humanitarian intervention, which Baker and Kissinger 
refer to as “pragmatic idealism.”2  The purpose of this thesis is to understand how the 
United States makes the case to intervene or to refrain from humanitarian intervention in 
the Post-Cold War era.  
Policymakers must weigh the costs and benefits when debating whether 
humanitarian intervention or nonintervention is in the best interest of the state. Many 
variables impact this process. Does the humanitarian crisis hold some strategic interest to 
the nation? Is the American public or Congress weary of interventions? Other factors that 
weigh upon the decision-making equation for humanitarian intervention include, but are 
not limited to, moral imperative, legitimacy, support of the international community, 
leadership personalities, domestic politics, media presence, and organizational interests. 
The U.S. decision-making process in humanitarian interventions is contingent 
upon so many factors that each case must be viewed in the context of its unique 
circumstances. Responsibility rests with the state or group of states executing the 
                                                 
1 Henry A. Kissinger and James A. Baker III, “Grounds for U.S. Military Intervention,” Washington 
Post, April 10, 2011, http://www.henryakissinger.com/articles/wp041011.html.  
2 Kissinger and Baker, “Grounds for U.S. Military Intervention.” 
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humanitarian intervention to justify it to both the international community and its 
citizens.3  National interest and moral outrage are two consistent forces present in the 
decision and justification process for humanitarian intervention, but their relative weights 
vary a good deal. The presence of one or both of these factors has the ability to sway the 
decision for or against intervention.4  This study reviews the foreign policy context and 
debate within the U.S. government across three case studies: Rwanda, Kosovo, and 
Libya. It also examines how national interest and moral outrage were apparent in each 
situation, in order to identify the tipping point at which policymakers made the final 
determination to use or refrain from military force for humanitarian intervention.  
A. SIGNIFICANCE 
Both NATO interventions in Kosovo and Libya have sparked debate over the 
compromise of sovereignty in exchange for the protection of individual rights. Shortly 
after Kosovo, the UN secretary general, Kofi Anan, urged the international community to 
reach a consensus on future interventions and cautioned, “This developing international 
norm in favor of intervention to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter will no doubt 
continue to pose profound challenges to the international community.”5 States, as well as 
the collective international community, are still wrestling with the problem of how to 
approach the concept of humanitarian intervention and how to establish coherent policy 
on it. 
B. DEFINITION 
Humanitarian intervention implies the use of force. It is separate from a 
peacekeeping mission or strictly humanitarian assistance. J. L. Holzgrefe provides a 
comprehensive definition of humanitarian intervention in his work about Ethical, Legal, 
and Political Dilemmas: “The threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or 
                                                 
3 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 287.  
4 Andrew Mason and Nick Wheeler, “Realist Objections to Humanitarian Intervention,” in The Ethical 
Dimensions of Global Change, ed. Barry Holden  (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1996), 95. 
 5 Kofi Annan, “Two Concepts of Sovereignty,” The Economist, September 16, 1999, 
http://www.economist.com/node/324795.   
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group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the 
fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the 
permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.”6   
In order to classify an intervention as humanitarian in nature, the rationale must 
include a moral imperative for military action. Reasons for humanitarian intervention 
almost always extend beyond ending human suffering, as is evident in the case studies of 
this thesis.7 Both national interest and the desire to end human suffering may present 
incentives for intervention and one may be stronger than the other. In some cases neither 
may be strong enough to motivate the use of military force, as shown by the Rwanda case 
study.8 In others, humanitarian concern provides a framework that lends credibility and 
moral weight to the pursuit of more traditional interests, as occurs in Kosovo and Libya.9 
Humanitarian intervention involves the use of force, and its conduct falls under 
the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which requires that (except in self-
defense) force be used internationally only upon UN Security Council (UNSC) 
authorization. In actions such as Kosovo and Libya, for which such authorization was 
absent, the U.S. felt an especially heavy burden to justify its actions to its own citizens 
and the global community, in terms of international law, ethical obligations, or political 
considerations.10  The decision for intervention must always be explained; however, in 
reality, the decision is often based upon the power relationship amongst stakeholders, and 
their capacity and willingness to act in given circumstances.11  
                                                 
6 J.L. Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, 
Legal, and Political Dilemmas, ed. J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane  (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 18.  
7 Daniel Moran, (professor and thesis advisor, Naval Postgraduate School), in discussion with the 
author, November 2014. 
8 Mason and Wheeler, “Realist Objections to Humanitarian Intervention,” 95. 
9 Daniel Moran, (professor and thesis advisor, Naval Postgraduate School), in discussion with the 
author, November 2014. 
10 Robert O. Keohane, “Introduction,” in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political 
Dilemmas, ed. J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1. 
11 Daniel Moran, (professor and thesis advisor, Naval Postgraduate School), in discussion with the 
author, November 2014. 
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C. BEGINNINGS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
The 19th century British philosopher John Stuart Mill published the essay A Few 
Words on Non-Intervention addressing the ethics of intervention in the affairs of other 
sovereign nations. Mill criticized Britain’s policymakers of his time for their self-centric 
speeches on England’s interests and concluded pure self-interest is the worst 
consideration for intervention: “But of all attitudes which a nation can take up on the 
subject of intervention, the meanest and worst is to profess that it interferes only when it 
can serve its own objects by it.”12  On the contrary, he supported reasons for intervention 
in “the service of others” including “to intercede for mild treatment of the vanquished,” 
and “to procure abandonment of some national crime and scandal to humanity such as the 
slave trade.”13 He conceded that as a powerful and civilized state, Britain could and 
should intervene for the purpose of sharing its civilized ideals such as free trade and the 
equality of all humans.14 The same 19th century debates surrounding intervention appear 
in the present. 
The mainstream political dialogue of the 1990s portrayed humanitarian 
intervention as being born from a new wave of multilateralism and from an end to the 
bipolar international system. The end of the Cold War certainly expanded the 
opportunities for U.S. intervention. However, states were using humanitarian intervention 
in the nineteenth century and earlier.15 Gary Bass, a firm believer that humanitarian 
intervention has always been an instrument of the state, describes how Theodore 
Roosevelt sought to protect the Cubans from Spanish atrocities and how the British 
intervened to end the slave trade.16  Throughout history, humanitarian intervention found 
a natural home among liberal democracies. These democratic forms of government 
exercised freedom of the press, which enabled the population to pressure government 
                                                 
12 John Stuart Mill, “A Few Words on Non-Intervention” Foreign Policy Perspectives No. 83 
(London: Libertarian Alliance, 1987),  3,  http://www.libertarian.co.uk/lapubs/forep/forep008.pdf. (essay 
originally published in Fraser’s Magazine, 1859).  
 13 Mill, “A Few Words on Non-Intervention,” 2. 
14 Mill, “A Few Words on Non-Intervention,” 2. 
15 Gary Bass, Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention (New York: Vintage 
Books, 2008), 5, 13.  
16 Bass, Freedom’s Battle, 3–4.  
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officials into action.   Bass claims the so-called cable news network (CNN) effect is a 
newer version of the same interaction that has occurred throughout history between the 
free press, public, and politicians.17 The same debates about violating sovereignty, 
imperialistic motivations, defense of human rights, and the influence of public opinion 
surrounded humanitarian intervention in the nineteenth century as they do today.18  One 
recurrent pattern of humanitarian intervention is the requirement for “a cold realpolitik 
calculation about the costs of intervening” and the “opportunistic” nature of governments 
in their humanitarian endeavors.19 Governments may determine humanitarian 
intervention is not worth the risks that accompany it. Understanding the nature of past 
humanitarian interventions is important because the same themes appear in present 
foreign policy. 
D. PERSPECTIVES ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
A specific theoretical framework for humanitarian intervention is not firmly 
established, but scholarly works examining humanitarian intervention are abundant. A 
few common themes exist across the literature on humanitarian intervention: the contrast 
between the traditional norm of sovereignty and intervention, the legitimacy of military 
operations, the change in strategic environment since the Cold War, the conflicting 
interests of domestic politics, public opinion, and national interest. Many scholars draw 
upon theories of international relations, international law, and ethics as a foundation.   
Humanitarian intervention is loosely codified in international law, and often the 
legal framework is manipulated to align with interests or is irrelevant. This thesis focuses 
on other political normalcies, which often prevail over a legalist framework.   In some 
cases, the U.S. justifies humanitarian intervention as an exception to the sovereignty 
norm. The U.S. explains its actions as legitimate, which becomes an important 
determinant of international acceptance of an intervention.   Legitimacy could either be 
                                                 
17 Bass, Freedom’s Battle, 7–8. 
18 Bass, Freedom’s Battle, 5. 
19 Bass, Freedom’s Battle, 8.  
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construed by adherence to international law or an established norm. Moral practice may 
outweigh laws.20  
 Public opinion is another political dilemma for policymakers. The tolerance of 
the public either compels or constrains policymaker actions. The Bush administration 
refrained from threatening physical intervention in Bosnia until the media published 
pictures of concentration camps, which outraged the public. Approval ratings for 
intervention went up immediately after images hit the news.21  Additionally, the public is 
more likely to support an operation that does not require U.S. men and women on the 
ground in combat.   Frequently, American presidents insert a national interest clause into 
their rhetoric on interventions. This is evident in presidential addresses leading up to 
interventions and may be absent in cases where the U.S. did not intervene. The national 
interest rhetoric may be tied to a strategic maneuver that is less visible to the public.22 
Nicholas Wheeler has been instrumental in building a foundation for the study of 
humanitarian intervention. In his book, Saving Strangers, Wheeler notes a disparity when 
comparing state commitment to the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention and 
subsequent state actions. The misalignment between state rhetoric and actual apparatuses 
to enforce human rights, or simply put inaction, has served as an enabler for governments 
to harm their own citizens. Additionally, he notes the disparity between using force in 
humanitarian crises and the firmly established principle on nonintervention. He proposes 
that some states have accepted the use of force for humanitarian intervention as an 
exception to the rule. Throughout seven case studies including Rwanda and Kosovo, 
Wheeler examines the motives of actors, legitimacy of the intervention, and final success 
of the operation.23  Noting “humanitarian intervention exposes the conflict between order 
and justice at its starkest,” he argues that the changes brought about by the emerging 
norm of humanitarian intervention both constrain and enable actors in the current world 
                                                 
20 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 2. 
 21 Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic 
Books, 2013), 276 - 79.  
22 Daniel Moran, (professor and thesis advisor, Naval Postgraduate School), in discussion with the 
author, November 2014. 
 23 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 1–2.  
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order.24  Most importantly, his work shows that legitimacy, as it pertains to humanitarian 
intervention, is not confined to international law, but may be determined by 
internationally and domestically accepted norms.25  Norms have the power to constrain or 
compel state actors.26  Wheeler argues that “a change in legitimizing principles will 
enable new actors that were previously inhibited.”27  This does not mean that because 
states are no longer constrained that they will act, as shown in Rwanda.   
Samantha Power, current U.S. ambassador to the UN, tells a thorough story of 
U.S. responses to genocide from the Holocaust to Kosovo. Her compilation, a large 
portion from interviews with influential policymakers, focuses on the forces at play in 
bureaucracy, Congress, and the administration during each of these humanitarian 
disasters. She also addresses how factors such as public opinion, domestic politics, and 
relations with allies impact the decision to intervene. Ultimately, she concludes that 
policymakers often knew a great deal about the horrors that were taking place but failed 
to act for various reasons. She determines that public opinion is slow to support 
intervention, and America’s leaders interpret silence from the public as indifference. 
Furthermore, she notes that leaders believe that the stakes will remain low by ignoring 
the situation, moralism is frowned upon among politicians, the U.S. has a low tolerance 
for placing troops on the ground, and policymakers are quick to look the other direction 
when vital American interests are not present. The decision to act only comes once 
political pressure is high enough.28  In her research on Rwanda, Power discovers that 
domestic pressure was not strong enough to result in action, and high-level officials took 
intervention off the table due to lack of national interest. Her case study on Kosovo 
reveals the implications of President Clinton’s rhetoric to the public, historical experience 
in Bosnia, and American reluctance to bear casualties.29  
                                                 
24 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 11.  
 25 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 2.  
26 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 5.  
27 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 8.  
28 Power, A Problem from Hell, XVI–XVIII.  
29 Power, A Problem from Hell, Ch12.  
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Critics of humanitarian intervention claim it is a mechanism for states to expand 
and maintain power. Tariq Ali calls NATO intervention in Kosovo, “a war for U.S. 
hegemony in Europe and the world.”30 Noam Chomsky is doubtful that the notion of 
humanitarian intervention is even humanitarian at all. He claims that almost every act of 
state aggression falls into the category of humanitarian intervention turning to 
Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia and Hitler’s invasion of Sudetenland as examples. This 
school of thought believes humanitarian intervention may only be branded as such when 
carried out by powerful states, usually Western. When employed by one of the remaining 
majority it is deemed unacceptable such as India’s intervention against Pakistan to stop 
the slaughter of Bengalis in Bangladesh or Vietnam’s offensive against the Pol Pot 
regime.31  For critics such as Ali and Chomsky, any act of humanitarianism by use of 
force is contrary to its meaning and imperialistic. 
Fundamental versions of the realist argument show that states will operate in their 
own interest and to preserve their own security within the international system. Some 
realists oppose interventions embarked upon solely on the grounds of morality, but 
believe that any action may be disguised with colorful rhetoric. In the purest view of 
realism, humanitarian intervention is irrelevant; there is only intervention and non-
intervention.32  Another component of the realist construct is that states will act as they 
wish regardless of international law. Wheeler, concerned with the legitimization process, 
makes an interesting contribution to this realist notion saying, “What is important, then, is 
to distinguish between power that is based on relations of domination and force, and 
power that is legitimate because it is predicated on shared norms.”33  
Other realists suggest that the U.S. cannot assume the entire global responsibility 
to solve humanitarian crises because this could lead to overstretch and be contrary to the 
nation’s security. However, when the U.S. does engage in humanitarian efforts with 
                                                 
 30 Tariq Ali, “NATO’s Balkan Adventure,” Monthly Review 52 no. 2 (June 1999), Proquest ID: 
213150915, 1. 
31 Noam Chomsky, “Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention” (speech, Williams College, September 
15, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=77U1tlAyWVA.  
32 Bass, Freedom’s Battle, 12 - 16.  
33 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 2.  
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force, the strategic objectives that accompany these missions should be acknowledged 
and the proper assets deployed to produce the intended results. Examples of strategic 
considerations tied to humanitarian intervention are regime change and nation building.34    
Contrary to the realist view that national interest is the principal driver of military 
force, Bass proposes that states have acted out of “genuine humanitarianism” in the 
past.35  He turns to the example of Britain’s use of military force to end the slave trade. 
This campaign diverged from Britain’s national interest by injuring relations with allies 
and hurting the economy. Britain assumed the risk of deploying naval forces to Africa 
and Cuba in the name of abolitionism; this was an act of true devotion to humanity and 
not an imperialistic mission. Bass uses this example to demonstrate that a state has 
previously acted and is able to act in a purely altruistic manner; however, he does not 
categorize the post-Cold War humanitarian interventions as genuine.36     
A second interesting factor to counter the realist perspective is the potential for 
solidarity to outweigh national interest. Commonalities or lack of connection amongst 
people in characteristics such as nationalism, religion, ethnicity, or physical distances 
affects the development of moral outrage that might pressure governments into a 
humanitarian intervention. Supporters of this notion attribute a deficit in solidarity 
between populations as the reason for Britain’s failure to prevent Hitler’s invasion of 
Czechoslovakia and America’s failure to stop the genocide in Rwanda. Bass also 
contends that the opposite effect could occur in which populations demand action on 
account of solidarity.37  Mass media and new technology can act as an expedient of 
solidarity by bridging the gap between distant populations. Bass notes, “Just as the 
growth of national consciousness relies on knowing about the lives of other members of 
the national community living far away, the growth of humanitarian concern for 
foreigners relies on knowing about the lives of foreigners.”38  The realist 
                                                 
34 Kissinger and Baker, “Grounds for U.S. Military Intervention.” 
35 Bass, Freedom’s Battle, 5. 
36 Bass, Freedom’s Battle, 18–19. 
37 Bass, Freedom’s Battle, 22–23. 
38 Bass, Freedom’s Battle, 27–28. 
 10 
counterargument to the preceding point may be that the media and solidarity do not hold 
enough power to result in political commitment the way that national interest does.   
E. NEW ATTITUDES  
The end of the Cold War marked a significant turning point in both politics and 
security for the United States. After the collapse of the Berlin wall, the U.S. political 
agenda shifted from engaging in great power politics to testing its new superpower status 
on the international stage. Other nations turned to the U.S. to provide a security umbrella 
and to maintain global order.39  Conflict among fragmented ethnic societies was a 
defining feature during this time period or at least it became more noticeable.40 After 
WWII, the international community emphasized non-interventionism and respect for 
sovereignty. These post-WWII values, embedded in the UN charter, did not align well 
with the humanitarian crises that spawned from internal wars and domestic conflicts 
throughout impoverished nations in the decade following 1989. Innovation in military 
technology and the availability of weapons were also a contributing factor to interstate 
violence.41  The world witnessed a surge in U.S. military missions beginning in the 
1990s: Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Libya.  
1. Media Impact Post-Cold War 
One theory proposes that media coverage exercises an independent influence on 
policymaking. It arouses emotion in the public, and also among policymakers, and 
dramatizes human suffering in ways that may favor intervention in scenarios that are not 
of strategic interest. Some crises receive more media attention than others, which may be 
a factor in itself. Somalia and Bosnia, it is argued, received so much attention that 
                                                 
39 David Hastings Dunn, “Innovation and Precedent in the Kosovo War: The Impact of Operation 
Allied Force on U.S. Foreign Policy,” International Affairs 85 no. 3 (2009), 532, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-
2346.2009.00812.x.  
40 Michael C. Davis, “The Emerging World Order: State Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention,” 
in International Intervention in the Post-Cold War World: Moral Responsibility and Power Politics, ed. 
Michael C. Davis et al. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 3–4.  
41 Davis, “The Emerging World Order,” 4.  
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policymakers took action, while journalists in Rwanda were hard to come by.42  
Assuming that the media is powerful enough to prioritize U.S. foreign policy decisions, it 
might well serve as a useful tool for establishing the moral imperative for humanitarian 
intervention; assuming that one believes the media actually possess such power. Not 
everyone does.43 
The 1990s were also characterized by a rapidly growing media industry, which 
played a critical role in military intervention, and continues to do so today. Peter 
Jakobsen conducted a comparative study examining the impact of legitimacy, national 
interest, chance of success, domestic support, and the “CNN effect” on UN peace 
enforcement operations. Jakobsen tries to answer the question: “How do states determine 
which conflicts are suitable for enforcement and which are not?”44  In his case study on 
Somalia, he concludes that the CNN effect was instrumental placing pressure on the 
administration; however, the decision to intervene in Somalia was largely based on 
probability of success.45  
The end of the Cold War gave journalists a new frame of reference within which 
to tell their stories. Such “framing” envisions the relationship between government and 
media as an interactive process in which the media shapes its message from government 
rhetoric, and policymakers shape their rhetoric from the media. This symbiotic 
relationship between the media and government in turn shapes public opinion.46 Absent 
the looming threat of communism, policymakers and media outlets struggled to justify 
the regional conflicts of the 1990s with reference to traditional concepts of national 
                                                 
42 Steven Livingston, “Limited Vision: How Both the American Media and Government Failed in 
Rwanda,” in Media and the Rwanda Genocide ed. Allan Thompson (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 192.  
43 Livingston, “Limited Vision,” 188–89; Daniel Moran, (professor and thesis advisor, Naval 
Postgraduate School), in discussion with the author, November 2014. 
 44 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace 
Enforcement After the Cold War,” Journal of Peace Research 33 no. 2 (May, 1996), 205, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/425437.  
45 Jakobsen, “National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN,” 209.  
46 Robert Entman, “Declaration of Independence: The Growth of Media Power after the Cold War,” in 
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interest and patriotism. Intervention was formulated in terms of humanitarianism in order 
to fill the conceptual void created by the collapse of the Soviet Union.47   
Once established, the concept of humanitarian intervention became a repeating 
theme in media reporting. Robert Entman, professor of media and international affairs, 
claims, “Foreign policy narratives frequently assume that one decision, in places like 
Somalia or Bosnia, betokens a decisive choice of role or category for U.S. foreign policy, 
rather than that the 1990s commenced a period –perhaps a very long one –of testing and 
groping to find a role or combination of roles for American military force and 
diplomacy.”48  This phenomenon resulted in much debate over whether the U.S. should 
take on the role of the world’s policeman or should remain isolated. During the post-Cold 
War era, the rapid advance of information technology also impacted foreign policy. 
Internet and satellite communications enabled cable news networks to stream instant 
footage from the battlefield. The flow of footage and public exposure fluctuated in 
relation to the coverage of domestic affairs and media interest in a crisis.49  Every U.S. 
citizen possessed the capability to stay informed on the humanitarian crises of the 
world.50  Whether public opinion shapes politics or politics shape public opinion is 
debatable; however, examining the role of the media does provide added value to 
understanding U.S. humanitarian intervention.   
F. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The U.S. is the central actor within the scope of this research. This study also 
encompasses U.S. actions in coordination with NATO and the UN. The political aspects 
of intervention will be a focal point, although it is difficult to completely refrain from 
some international law as it relates to legitimacy and the definition of genocide. 
Furthermore, this study examines general literature on humanitarian intervention and 
more specific works on intervention in Rwanda, Kosovo, and Libya. A case study 
                                                 
47 Entman, “Declarations of Independence,” 14–15. 
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approach reveals how the U.S. reconciled national interest in each situation. Through 
qualitative analysis, I have gathered evidence in hopes of determining how the U.S. 
reached its decision point for either intervention or nonintervention in each case study 
and the implications of these interventions for subsequent U.S. policy actions. Similarly, 
all three case studies occur after the Cold War and amidst an incessant media machine.  
Somalia played a critical role in shaping U.S. intervention policy throughout the 
remainder of the decade. Jeffrey Herbst and Walter Clarke indicate the intervention in 
Somalia influenced U.S. policy on Rwanda, Bosnia, and the doctrines of NATO and the 
UN.51  The Rwanda case study illustrates the U.S. refusal to make the case for 
intervention and the absence of moral outrage from the public. Next, after a period of 
inaction in Bosnia and Rwanda, Kosovo reveals how the Clinton administration 
approached humanitarian crises, and set a precedent for joint action that is not sanctioned 
by the UN. President Bill Clinton proclaimed an idealistic doctrine to the U.S. troops who 
supported the NATO operation in Kosovo shortly after the campaign: “Never forget if we 
can do this here, and if we can then say to the people of the world, whether you live in 
Africa, or Central Europe, or any other place, if somebody comes after innocent civilians 
and tries to kill them en masse…it’s within our power to stop it, we will stop it.”52  
Lastly, the Libya case study comes after the birth of the official Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P) concept when the UN recognized it at the 2005 World Summit. Additionally, this 
is the only case following the U.S. war on terror. The international community emerges 
from Libya divided on the concept of humanitarian intervention with some claiming the 
operation was worth the lives saved and others citing it as guise for strategic power 
politics.53  
                                                 
 51 Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, “Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention,” Foreign 
Affairs 75 no. 2 (April, 1996), 70, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20047489.  
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II. RWANDA 
The U.S. chose not to intervene against the machete-wielding Interahamwe, and 
its followers in the spring of 1994. President Clinton reflected back on the Rwanda crisis 
in his autobiography: “We were so preoccupied with Bosnia, with the memory of 
Somalia just six months old, and with opposition in Congress to military deployments in 
faraway places not vital to our national interest that neither I nor any one of my foreign 
policy team adequately focused on sending troops to stop the slaughter…This failure to 
try to stop Rwanda’s tragedies became one of the greatest regrets of my presidency.”54  
Despite the slaughter of almost a million people, intervention was of no strategic interest 
and the public never demanded action. Policymakers and the Clinton administration 
never attempted to make a case for intervention because both national interest and moral 
outrage were not strong enough to warrant such action. The lack of U.S. attention 
resulted in inaction from the rest of the global community and the UN.55  
This case study begins with historical information on the Rwanda crisis, and then 
leads into the U.S. policymaking environment in 1994. Findings disclose the U.S. 
mindset towards peacekeeping operations in the bureaucracy and at the executive level. 
Evidence supports that the U.S. had intelligence before the outbreak of violence and 
knew what was occurring in Rwanda long before it acknowledged it to be genocide two 
months later. The events in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia all impacted the context in which 
policymakers deliberated action in Rwanda. The Pentagon, the Clinton administration, 
and Congress never pushed national interest as a reason for intervention. The public and 
the media did not create sufficient moral outrage to pressure policymakers into action. 
This case study shows that humanitarian intervention was never a policy option for 
Rwanda. The tipping point in the direction of nonintervention was determined by events 
in Somalia in 1993.  
                                                 
54 Bill Clinton, My Life:Vol II The Presidential Years (New York: Vintage Books, 2005), 167.  
55 Jared Cohen, One Hundred Days of Silence: America and the Rwanda Genocide (New York: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 3. 
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A. BACKGROUND  
Rwanda gained independence from Belgium in 1962. During Belgian colonial 
rule, members of the Tutsi tribe resided a social class above the Hutus. After gaining 
independence, Hutus took control of the government, reversing the structure of Rwandan 
society. With the Hutus in power, ethnic tensions caused many Tutsis to flee to 
neighboring Uganda.   In Uganda, the Tutsis regrouped to form the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF). In 1990, the RPF tried to regain lost ground in Rwanda by inciting a civil 
war with the Rwandan government. Over the course of the next three years, Hutu 
extremism emerged and Rwandan society became accustomed to ethnic animosity toward 
the Tutsis and also moderate Hutus.56 Eventually, the Arusha accords arranged for a 
cease-fire between the Rwandan government and the RPF. The UN, led by General 
Romeo Dallaire, entered Rwanda on a Chapter VI peacekeeping mission to enforce the 
terms of the agreement. The situation destabilized immediately after a plane, carrying 
Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana, crashed. Within hours it became clear that 
Hutu extremists had been preparing systematic extermination of all Tutsis and their 
supporters. Roadblocks, door-to-door killings, and radio broadcasts directing the violence 
foreshadowed of events to come. U.S. diplomats witnessed the commencement of 
persecution first hand as neighbors and acquaintances pleaded for refuge under their 
protection in the first hours.57 Over the course of the next 100 days, Hutu extremists 
killed an estimated 800,000 Rwandans because they were Tutsi or Tutsi supporters, while 
more than two million others fled as refugees. 
In 1998, President Clinton apologized to the people of Rwanda stating, “It may 
seem strange to you here, especially the many of you who lost members of your family, 
but all over the world there were people like me sitting in offices, day after day after day, 
who did not fully appreciate the depth and the speed with which you were being engulfed 
                                                 
56 Richard Weitz, Project on National Security Reform: Case Studies Working Group Report Volume 
II (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 460, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/ 
display.cfm?pubID=1100.  
57 “Ghosts of Rwanda,” Frontline, directed by Greg Barker and Darren Kemp (Alexandria, VA: PBS 
Video, 2004), DVD.  
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by this unimaginable terror.”58 Some claim that events unfolded so rapidly in Rwanda 
that the U.S. could not intervene in time to make a difference. Other evidence suggests 
that the U.S. had ample indications and warnings of genocide in Rwanda, purposely 
avoiding and undermining the option for military intervention.59  This chapter examines 
the variables impacting the U.S. decision-making process in the spring of 1994 and 
identifies the reasons why the U.S. chose not to intervene in this humanitarian 
catastrophe. Ultimately, national interest and moral imperative were not robust enough to 
convince the Clinton administration to take action.   
B. THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
The 1990s ushered in a new wave of multilateralism, peacekeeping, and the 
promotion of American values abroad. The 1992 presidential campaign was the first 
since the end of the Cold War. Clinton’s campaign platform on foreign policy included 
promises of spreading American democratic values abroad and multilateral action using 
force if necessary to do so.60  Early in 1993, the Clinton administration initially 
recognized peacekeeping and participation in UN missions as part of U.S. national 
interest. In opposition, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, 
expressed concern over expanding the military’s role into peacekeeping.61 The death of 
eighteen Army Rangers in a faraway African country shortly after the presidential 
inauguration quickly squelched Clinton’s vision of multilateral peacekeeping in 
American foreign policy. 
1. PDD-25  
Presidential Review Decision 13 (PRD) set out to codify Clinton’s assertive 
multilateralism categorizing humanitarian threats abroad as threats to the national 
                                                 
58 Bill Clinton (speech, address to genocide survivors at the airport in Kigali, Rwanda, March 25, 
1998), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/text-of-clintons-rwanda-speech/.  
59 Weitz, Project on National Security Reform, 471. 
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61 Weitz, Project on National Security Reform, 449.  
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interest. After the fiasco in Somalia, policymakers redesigned the document to adjust for 
a shift in policy, and PRD-13 transformed into Presidential Decision Directive 25 
(PDD).62  Multilateral peacekeeping came under scrutiny, and the military believed 
peacekeeping interfered with the capability to fight two simultaneous regional wars.63  As 
a result, President Clinton wanted to bridge the gap between the Pentagon and the 
administration by establishing a unified policy on peacekeeping operations.64  The end 
compromise was PDD-25, signed on May 6, 1994, and titled U.S. Policy on Reforming 
Multilateral Peace Operations. PDD-25 sought to reduce U.S. spending on UN peace 
operations, to encourage the reform of UN peacekeeping operations, and to force other 
UN nations to bear more responsibility for providing resources for peace enforcement 
and peacekeeping operations.65  It addressed “factors to be considered in voting on UN 
peace operations resolutions” and clarified the circumstances for sending U.S. troops in 
support of UN missions.66 Its primary author, also director of the peacekeeping desk at 
the National Security Council (NSC), Richard Clarke, indicated that the document was 
meant to salvage peacekeeping by ensuring that U.S. participation in operations remained 
effective. Critics called the directive a “restrictive checklist” that constrained U.S. 
participation in UN missions including the response to Rwanda.67  
    Some of the following factors noted from the directive may provide insight into 
the decision for nonintervention in Rwanda and the foreign policy environment in 
Washington at the time. The directive requires the following criteria be considered when 
voting on UN peacekeeping operations: 
 
                                                 
62 Cohen, One Hundred Days of Silence, 49,51.  
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I.  National interest and international community of interest must be at risk. 
II. The threat to international peace should be one in regional character. This 
includes humanitarian catastrophes paired with violence.   
III. Mission objectives clearly fit on the spectrum between peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement and include a reasonable estimate for duration of 
conflict and understanding whether the use of force will be required.   
IV. The international community considers the consequences of inaction 
unacceptable. 
If U.S. troops are to participate in the operation, the following additional criteria must be 
considered: 
V. The risks to American troops have been considered in conjunction with 
national interest.  
VI. Adequate resources exist. 
VII. The command and control structure is acceptable to the U.S. 
VIII. U.S. participation is necessary for success and the role of U.S. troops is 
linked to clear objectives and an identifiable end state for participation. 
IX.  Domestic and congressional support exists or can be aroused.68    
PDD-25 had a profound impact on the policymaking environment in Washington. 
In the absence of a detailed strategy on humanitarian intervention in the early 1990s, 
policymakers turned to PDD-25 as the governing doctrine.69  Although the PDD was not 
signed until about a month after the genocide in Rwanda began, its principles had become 
accepted guidelines simply by circulation. Consequently, the guidelines codified in the 
document played a role in how policymakers responded to the crisis or at least how they 
perceived what an appropriate response would look like.70  The State Department was no 
longer the lead authority on peacekeeping missions. The PDD now incorporated 
Congress, as appropriator of funds, and the military as supplier of force into the 
policymaking process. The decision process slowed with the additional requirement for 
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interagency cooperation between the Pentagon, the State Department, and Congress. 
Some key players used the PDD as a tool to oppose intervention.71   
Internal politics may have been a factor as well. According to Clinton’s National 
Security Advisor (NSA), Tony Lake, a discussion on whether action in Rwanda aligned 
with PDD-25 never took place. Clarke may have viewed Rwanda as an opportunity to 
utilize his directive to say “no” to non-strategic initiatives.72  If anything PDD-25 
hindered those at the action level from pushing options for Rwanda up the chain. 
Evidence suggests the Clinton administration and the Pentagon had predetermined that 
intervention in Rwanda would never be in U.S. national interest regardless if it met the 
standards outlined in the document.73  PDD-25 shaped attitudes in DC, but really it 
served as a scapegoat for a policy decision that had already been made at the highest 
levels of government.  
C. NATIONAL INTEREST 
A hearing before the House Subcommittee on Africa was held almost a month 
after violence broke out in Rwanda. Committee members made it clear that the insertion 
of U.S. troops, at risk of becoming “cannon fodder,” was not an option.74  Members 
referenced futile public diplomacy efforts and personal phone calls to the Rwanda 
government urging a cease in the violence as methods for preventing violence.75  
Congressman Dan Burton’s line, “I wish there was something we could do,” summarized 
the attitudes in the hearing.76  The committee’s stated goals were to ensure the murderers 
knew they would be held accountable, refuse to acknowledge any government created by 
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force, deny visas to those involved in the violence, and conduct humanitarian assistance 
air drops. The term genocide was avoided throughout the hearing and much of the debate 
revolved around the civil war between the RPF and the Rwandan government rather than 
the ongoing systematic massacre.77  Testimony from Dr. Alison Des Forges, a member of 
the African Division within Human Rights Watch, quickly invalidated the opening 
discussions of the subcommittee. Looking back at the hearing twenty years later, Des 
Forges exhibited a comprehensive and clear understanding of the situation in Rwanda at 
the time. She detailed to Congress how the vast majority of killing was due to genocide 
and not a civil war. She proposed that Western troops could easily combat the killers, 
only armed with machetes. She pointed out that the Pope had already designated the 
situation as genocide, and the United States and the UN were avoiding its legal 
obligation. Maintaining direct contact with her colleagues in Rwanda, she corrected 
committee members by affirming that Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) 
was operational and still directing the killing of Tutsis. Lastly, she politely indicated that 
U.S. efforts as they were would not stop the genocide, and the U.S. approval to withdraw 
UN peacekeepers exacerbated the deteriorating situation.78  In retrospect, it appears 
members of Congress assumed that military intervention was out of the question; the pros 
and cons were never debated.  
A Rwandan case study from the U.S. Army War College consolidates evidence 
that the international community and the U.S. were clearly aware of the situation brewing 
in Rwanda before violence suddenly broke after the death of President Habyarimana on 
April 6, 1994. First, Belgium previously warned of genocide in February of 1994.79  
Second, CIA reports prior to the outbreak in violence predicted mass killing. It had found 
indicators of the impending ethnic violence in January of 1993, and knew that four 
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million tons of small arms had been transferred to Rwanda.80  Third, General Dallaire, 
the Commander of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), loudly voiced 
concern of an impending and coordinated killing campaign being planned by the Hutu 
extremists after receiving information from an informant. The UN ignored his cable, 
which cautioned about the targeting of Tutsis.81   Evidence supports the U.S. knew of 
possible genocide prior to April 6, 1994.  
Once violence began, the U.S. received enough reports of massacre within hours 
after the plane crash to distinguish it from the patterns of violence characteristic of civil 
war. The day following the crash, the Deputy Chief of Mission, Joyce Leader, witnessed 
the violence first hand and was informed of “systematic killing of Tutsis.”82  Dallaire’s 
cables reported ethnic cleansing and within four days he was asking for an additional 
5,000 troops.83  Hundreds of Rwandans convened at Ambassador David Rawson’s home 
for a safe haven.84  It’s difficult to imagine that the highest ranking U.S. official in 
Rwanda didn’t understand why hundreds of Rwandans were knocking on his door. In an 
interview with Frontline, Rawson admitted that when he returned to DC he was kept at 
the mid-level, and he was not consulted by the deputies committee, which was calling the 
shots.85   The counterargument is that the genocide was not readily apparent amongst the 
chaotic civil war, evacuation operation, misleading Rwandan government, and confused 
media reporting.86      
Despite its knowledge of the violence, the U.S. did not intervene, and indirectly 
undermined UN efforts by backing the removal of troops and refusing logistical support. 
It never entertained the possibility of smaller scale actions to hinder the genocide. U.S. 
officials were aware of broadcasts from RTLM urging the killing of Tutsis, and serving 
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as an information sharing mechanism among the killers to locate and isolate Tutsis.87 The 
option of jamming RTLM did reach the highest levels of government, but was shot down 
on account of fear that it would lead to further U.S. commitment. Officials blamed a lack 
of resources, violation of international law, and divergence from diplomatic protocol for 
the infeasibility of this option.88  Furthermore, the U.S. never publicly released names in 
an effort to hold Rwandan leaders accountable. The UN allowed Rwanda, which was 
coincidentally serving as a rotating member of the UNSC, to remain in standing.89 The 
Department of Defense (DOD) opposed the augment of UN troops or support in the form 
of logistics to UNAMIR.90  Eventually in mid-May the UN passed a resolution for 
UNAMIR II, but its deployment preparations proved too slow to make a difference. The 
leasing of 50 armored personnel carriers (APCs) was another sluggish endeavor by the 
U.S. Interagency disagreement and bureaucratic red tape prevented the effective and 
timely deployment of the vehicles, resulting in the slowed deployment of UNAMIR II 
troops.91   
The Army War College case study reveals that the interagency collaborative 
process for a solution was too slow moving for the rapid pace of the genocide.92 The 
State Department, Pentagon, Clinton administration, and NSC failed to develop a strategy 
and the highest levels of government, and never demanded integration of planning 
efforts. Without the demand for a collective effort, a small group controlled the speed at 
which decisions were made on Rwanda.93  Very little interagency discussions or planning 
took place as the violence unfolded. Lake never convened a meeting of the principles.94  
The State Department team that had witnessed the situation first hand during the 
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evacuation of westerners was never consulted.95  The European Combatant Commander 
(EUCOM) regularly monitored Rwanda and was instructed to limit planning efforts to an 
evacuation shortly after the president’s death.96  Organizational preferences derailed any 
decision process as well. Powell saw peacekeeping as a distraction from the military’s 
primary role.97  The State Department remained focused on salvaging the Arusha Peace 
Process and diplomacy with the Rwandan government instead of the ongoing genocide.98  
Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, thought that UNAMIR no longer fit into its 
mandate.99  Lastly, Congress was trapped by the opinions of its constituents, who were 
weary from Somalia, and especially the republicans remained critical the Clinton 
administration’s foreign policy following Somalia.100 
The lack of collaboration, slow interagency discussions, and organizational 
politics would not have mattered if humanitarian intervention in Rwanda had been in 
U.S. national interest. The commonly accepted theme, however, was that foreign policy 
issues in Africa were viewed as non-vital interests by the national security organization. 
Genocide in Rwanda posed no direct threat to U.S. security or economic interests. The 
U.S. had no bases, resources, or significant trade partners in Africa.101 The international 
community, aside from perhaps neighboring countries in Africa, felt the same way. 
Dallaire commented that UNAMIR was at the very bottom of the list of 16 UN missions 
being executed in 1994. The Rwanda genocide developed into regional crisis with one 
million refugees flooding into Zaire and conflict in the Congo. In the past, the potential 
for an interstate crisis to spread into regional violence has been substantial enough for the 
U.S. to intervene on behalf of international interest, but still a regional threat in Africa 
                                                 
95 Weitz, Project on National Security Reform, 480. 
96 Weitz, Project on National Security Reform, 486. 
97 Weitz, Project on National Security Reform, 449.  
98 Weitz, Project on National Security Reform, 509.  
99 Cohen, One Hundred Days of Silence, 6. 
100 Cohen, One Hundred Days of Silence, 3. 
101 Weitz, Project on National Security Reform, 511.  
 25 
was not enough to spur intervention. Nonintervention tarnished UN credibility and U.S. 
reputation for promoting liberal values abroad.102  
1. Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti  
At first glance, the murder of Belgian UNAMIR peacekeepers seemed eerily 
similar to the murder of Pakistani peacekeepers in Somalia. Somalia was Clinton’s first 
experience in post-Cold War peacekeeping, and the domestic backlash from its failure 
was still fresh in his mind. Some policymakers and the public immediately placed 
Rwanda in the same category as Somalia. Both were in Africa and both were a far threat 
from the U.S. homeland. The memory of Somalia could not be erased regardless of how 
it differed from Rwanda. In fact, the situations are different. Somalia’s situation unfolded 
from a lack of institutions and the chaos created by a war lord system. Rwanda, on the 
other hand, resulted directly from the existence of government institutions and not a lack 
thereof.103 Either way the Clinton concept of U.S. national interest had reformed after 
Somalia and impacted the response to Rwanda.  
Just a week after Somalia, the U.S. faced more embarrassment in Haiti after anti-
American demonstrators prevented the USS Harland County from disembarking its 
troops to join the UN mission.104  Due to the island’s proximity, restoring democracy in 
Haiti was a national interest item and a priority for the United States. Additionally, 
fighting and atrocities had been ongoing in Bosnia since 1992. Although, Bosnia was not 
a clear vital interest of the administration at first, it grabbed U.S. attention and took 
priority over Rwanda because of its geostrategic location. Rwanda was one of six 
ongoing UN missions in Africa when the genocide started. Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and 
the rest of the UN missions strained the Clinton administration, which wanted to cut costs 
and participation.105 
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D. WHAT GENOCIDE? 
Article I of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide reads, “The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed 
in time of peace, or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they 
undertake to prevent and to punish.”106 The RPF wrote a letter to the UNSC comparing 
the situation in Rwanda to the Holocaust. The intention was to remind the UN of its 
obligations, especially after initial appeals went unanswered.107   
Driving the debate over whether genocide was occurring or not was the definition 
of the word itself. Legal definitions of genocide are anything but concrete, and 
policymakers approach it cautiously due to its legal implications. There was no open 
resource for the U.S. State Department’s official definition of genocide. Merriam-
Webster Online defines genocide as “the deliberate and systematic destruction of a racial, 
political, or cultural group.”  The most widely accepted definition of genocide is found in 
the 1948 UN convention, which defines it as “any of the following acts committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethical, racial, or religious group, as 
such:” 
I. “Killing members of the group 
II. Causing serious bodily harm or mental harm to members of the group 
III. Deliberately inflicting on the group the conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or part 
IV. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group 
V. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group”108 
 The variability in definition allows it to be manipulated in such a way that it can 
be used to support political objectives. Powerful states like the U.S. have more flexibility 
in their interpretations of international law, and therefore the political responses that 
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accompany those interpretations. U.S. spokespersons skirted around the definition 
claiming that the intent of the killers still needed to be determined and more facts were 
needed to prove the situation was genocide.109  Rwanda was not designated as genocide 
until it could no longer be denied. Later, the situation in Kosovo would authorize use of 
the term genocide much earlier in the course of events to facilitate political objectives.110  
Both Samantha Power’s research and the Rwanda case study from the U.S. Army 
War College reveal that the United States received indications of genocide months before 
April 1994 and further clear evidence once killings began. There was hesitation amongst 
the UN, the U.S., the media, and Dallaire himself to officially state the situation in 
Rwanda was genocide. For the U.S. and the UN, doing so meant a legal obligation to act. 
Dallaire and the media were certain ethnic cleansing was occurring, but did not recognize 
the scale of genocide for some time. If Rwanda was labeled as genocide, then both U.S. 
and UN credibility could be at stake if they failed to act.111 Nearly two months after the 
killing, the State Department’s spokesperson, Christine Shelley, skirted around what was 
obvious: genocide was occurring. The rhetorical dance left Secretary of State 
Christopher, no choice but to acknowledge the term.112   
1. Media  
Rwanda received far less media attention than other crises of its time. At any one 
time in April there were only about ten to fifteen reporters on the ground in Rwanda 
mostly from Agence France-Presse (AFP), Radio France International (RFI), and the 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC).113  Other stories took priority: Bosnia, Haiti, 
the election in South Africa, and the OJ Simpson murder. In April 1994, there were twice 
as many articles on Bosnia than on Rwanda.114  Dallaire noted, “in fact one of the great 
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shocking things of even the genocide as we move into that phase was the fact that on 
NBC, ABC and CBS there was more air time given to Tonya Harding kneecapping her 
colleague than there was to the genocide in Rwanda.”115  When Rwanda story surfaced, it 
was dismissed as routine African tribal violence, and the focus remained on the flow of 
refugees or the victorious evacuation of Westerners.116   
As far as the media was concerned, Rwanda was in a state of tribal civil war 
throughout the month of April and not a state of genocide. Mark Doyle, one of the few 
journalists on the ground, refrained from calling the killing “genocide” until three weeks 
after it started. Instead the message was of a typical “chaotic Africa,” “civil war,” and a 
“shooting war.”117  Journalists for the most part didn’t have a clear understanding of what 
was going on until a few weeks into the massacres. Once it became clear, journalists in 
the field reported the killing as genocide up the chain. Media headquarters back at the 
BBC took a while to fully understand the situation. Journalists were encouraged to report 
both the Rwanda government and RPF perspectives on events because the concept of 
genocide seemed unbalanced and unbelievable at first.118  Finally, in July of 1994, the 
world began to comprehend the scale of the situation in Rwanda when 500 journalists 
swarmed into the town of Goma, Zaire to cover the refugee flows.119 
American media coverage on Rwanda was disproportionately less than other 
stories and unconvincing to the public. First, news coverage of international events 
dropped more than 10% in 1992 and remained low. Second, American media focused on 
other stories. The refugee crisis in Haiti was close to home, and the inauguration of 
Nelson Mandela took up significant air time in May.120  Americans connected to the 
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reporting on Bosnia because of its location to major European cities.121 Third, the 
majority of stories centered on Hutu refugee camps rather than the killing inside 
Rwanda.122   
Despite the well accepted notion that increased coverage leads to moral outrage, 
which leads to intervention, some scholars contend that the amount of media coverage is 
irrelevant to the decision for intervention. Steven Livingston suggests that the CNN effect 
is a myth. For example, he attributes the intervention in Somalia not to news images, but 
rather to pressure from members of Congress. Furthermore, if media reporting had 
identified genocide in Rwanda in a timelier manner, the United States still would have 
refrained from intervention because of national interest. The stigma of American media at 
the time was that it had previously initiated a policy response that failed in Somalia, and 
as a result, policymakers feared bending to the media for other humanitarian crises.123  
On the ground, Dallaire believed the opposite. He used the media as a weapon and 
engaged journalists as a line of communication with the West.124  
E. SUMMARY 
U.S. government and society were reluctant to get involved in peacekeeping 
operations in Africa no matter the circumstances. The reason for intervention was not 
because the U.S. didn’t know what was happening or couldn’t keep up with the pace of 
the genocide. Simply phrased, missions in Africa could no longer be justified as national 
interest. Several factors contributed and reinforced the decision for nonintervention aside 
from the primary reason of recent events in Somalia. The U.S. was in the process of 
reforming its peacekeeping doctrine. Policymakers assumed that nothing could be done to 
stop the genocide. Media response was inadequate. The message of genocide was not 
conveyed to the world until the end of April. Even then, coverage was overshadowed by 
events thought to be more relevant. The evacuation of Westerners and refugee camps 
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received more attention than the genocide, perhaps because it was so unimaginable. News 
stories did not arouse the moral necessity for action and neither did the public. As a result 
politicians were not pressured into the use of force. They were finally pressured into 
admitting genocide had happened after it became undeniable.    
Rwanda was not the first time the U.S. looked the other way from genocide on 
behalf of its own national interest. In the 1970s, President Nixon and Secretary of State, 
Henry Kissinger, stood by their ally, Pakistan, as it slaughtered Bengalis in 
Bangladesh.125    Once the facts surfaced over the Rwanda genocide, there was minimal 
blowback from the American public over the Clinton administration’s failure to act. 
Later, both 2000 presidential campaign candidates concurred that they would have stayed 
out of Rwanda.126 
Inaction in Rwanda would stay with the Clinton administration throughout its 
tenure and resurface after the killings at Srebrenica and ethnic tensions in Kosovo. 
Clinton mentions regret in his autobiography over inaction and Power claims Rwanda 
had implications on policy decisions in Kosovo.127   It’s difficult to measure how much 
remorse Clinton and his associates carried with them after the genocide and if that guilt 
played a role in future policy decisions. This case study serves as a clear demonstration 
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III. KOSOVO 
In April 1999, Tony Blair addressed the Economic Club of Chicago: “Twenty 
years ago we would not have been fighting in Kosovo. We would have turned our backs 
on it.”128   He said this because twenty years ago, the Cold War would have precluded an 
intervention in Kosovo. By the end of his speech, Prime Minister Blair had clearly 
pronounced his guidelines and objectives for military action in Kosovo also known as the 
Blair Doctrine. He explains that this type of military intervention is the result of changes 
brought about by the end of the Cold War and also the rapid progress of globalization. 
More importantly, he states that these changes have led to a crucial “political and security 
phenomenon.”129    
This case study begins with historical information on the province of Kosovo, and 
then describes the factors that influenced the U.S. decision-making process leading up to 
the commencement of NATO airstrikes on March 24, 1999. Supporting evidence shows 
that the U.S. embarked upon a strategy of coercive diplomacy leading up to the bombing, 
and officials in the executive branch supported a military option in the event of failed 
diplomacy early in the decision-making process. Unlike Rwanda, the Clinton 
administration fully engaged Congress months in advance to inform it of the strategic 
implications of armed conflict in Kosovo. Dialogue shows that although hope existed for 
a diplomatic solution, the executive branch was ready and willing to use U.S. forces for 
NATO air strikes or as part of a peacekeeping force on the ground. Prior dealings with 
Slobodan Milosevic, the changing role of NATO, the emphasis on advancing democratic 
institutions in the 1990s, and other humanitarian crises in the same decade impacted the 
mindset of policymakers in their search for a solution in the Balkans. The media pressure 
from U.S. policy decisions in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Srebrenica was a recent memory. By 
spring of 1998, the Pentagon, Department of State, and DOD informed Congress of the 
national interests that were at stake. As the operation began, the media served as the 
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channel to inform the public about both the national and moral interests on the line. This 
case study shows that humanitarian intervention was a policy option for Kosovo early in 
the decision process. The Clinton administration recognized the option of using force a 
year before the Kosovo intervention. The tipping point in the direction of intervention 
was determined by the outcome of peace negotiations at the Rambouillet conference in 
February 1999.  
A. THE BALKANS  
A brief background is necessary to fully understand the intervention in Kosovo. 
The creation of an independent Albanian state in 1913 excluded many ethnic Albanians 
residing in neighboring territory known as Kosovo, which Serbia had recently conquered 
during the first Balkan War. Later, Yugoslavia, an ethnically diverse state drawn up in 
the aftermath of WWI, encompassed the Kosovo region. Yugoslavia’s leader, Josip Tito, 
rebuilt the state after its dissolution in WWII, but this time with Kosovo as an 
autonomous province governed by the republic of Serbia.   
Yugoslavia has always suffered from powerful Albanian and Serbian nationalist 
ideologies, but the rise of Serbian strongman, Milosevic, irritated the situation. He 
recalled Kosovo’s previously granted autonomy in 1989 further isolating 90% of the 
ethnic Albanian population residing there. Albanians living in Kosovo wanted self-
determination, and they created their own institutions. Tensions in Kosovo continued to 
fester throughout the 1990s, while Milosevic waged war over the Yugoslav province of 
Bosnia. By 1998 armed violence between Serbian police forces and the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) caught the attention of the international community including 
the United States. Eventually, the clear threat of airstrikes from NATO enabled Richard 
Holbrooke, presidential envoy to the Balkans, to negotiate an agreement in October 1998. 
The agreement resulted in the draw down in forces and violence, but only temporarily. 
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Ultimately, Milosevic’s diplomatic games resulted in an intervention from NATO in 
March 1999.130  
B. THE KOSOVO CONTEXT    
Several contextual factors from the decade leading up to the 1999 NATO air 
campaign, Operation Allied Force (OAF), are important when considering U.S. reasons 
for intervention in Kosovo. Some of these influences prior to the Kosovo intervention 
include the unipolar international order, the Clinton ideal of liberalism through protecting 
democratic institutions, the transformation of NATO, the proximity of other humanitarian 
crises in the previous decade, and the gaps within the Dayton Peace Accord. First, the 
unipolar international order made the U.S. the most critical player in multilateral 
operations conducted by international organizations such as the UN and NATO. As a 
result of this hegemonic power, the U.S. found itself able to conduct its foreign policy in 
Europe through NATO.131  Second, U.S. foreign policy at the time encompassed the idea 
that spreading democracy and capitalism would help sustain a peaceful international 
order and therefore be in the U.S. national interest. For the Clinton administration, the 
definition of national interest included the spreading liberal values. The most practical 
way for the U.S. to carry out this flavor of foreign policy was through multilateral 
collaboration. Applying Clinton’s ideals to foreign policy, policymakers portrayed a 
multilateral intervention in the Balkans as national interest because such action would 
spread Western values and result in a more stable region. Looking back to the prior case 
study, stability in Rwanda would have had minimal impact on U.S. national interest. In 
contrast, Kosovo was a geostrategic location nestled near U.S. European allies and just 
beyond prior Soviet satellite states; tyranny in the Balkans contradicted American 
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values.132  Third, whether intended or not, the U.S. was essential in the transformation of 
NATO after the Cold War. NATO had been a collective defense organization during the 
Cold War, but now needed to alter its stance toward Russia and shift focus to the 
promotion of stability and liberal institutions in the region.133   The international order, 
the Neo-Wilsonian foreign policy of the U.S., and the transformation of NATO all 
contributed to the context in which the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo took place.  
The slow or inadequate response to humanitarian crises in Rwanda, Bosnia, and 
the Srebrenica massacre earlier in the decade also influenced the thought process 
regarding Kosovo.   Samantha Power suggested that both Clinton and Madeline Albright 
felt guilt over inaction in Rwanda and feared another Srebrenica if ethnic cleansing in 
Kosovo continued unchecked.134  U.S. leadership came under scrutiny in 1995 for failure 
to prevent mass killing at Srebrenica. European leaders, members of Congress, the media, 
and the public criticized the passive engagement of the U.S. in Bosnia.135  France and 
London both pointed out that the U.S. was failing in its role as the leader of NATO. 
Unlike Rwanda, the implications of inaction in Srebrenica were felt by the Clinton 
administration in the political arena.136  Within the Clinton administration, the 
“institutional memory” of Bosnia was fresh and tainted by dealings with Milosevic.137  
Holbrooke, who had directly negotiated with Milosevic for three years, was familiar with 
the leader’s tendency to come to the negotiating table while buying time for his military 
operations.138  By 1999, the Clinton administration, tired of dealing with Milosevic and 
his antics, was more than ready to contribute military force to put the leader back in his 
place.  
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Policymakers failed to address the unrest in Kosovo in the Dayton Peace 
Agreement. The peace agreement was vague and did not address whether Kosovo should 
have self-determination. Instead, the agreement reaffirmed the current Serbian borders. 
Albanian Kosovar fighters mobilized to form the KLA because they felt disregarded in 
the peace process and needed to protect their own interests.139  The Dayton Peace 
agreement left many issues unsettled in addition to the problem of what to do with 
Kosovo. Specifically, it failed to address the prosecution of war criminals remaining after 
the Bosnia and Srebrenica crises. War criminals remained free in Serbia despite warnings 
from General Wesley Clark, who would later become NATO’s Supreme Allied 
Commander. NATO peacekeeping forces did not chase down nationalist groups, which 
still thrived in Serbia, due to fear of disrupting the fragile peace in the region.140  Viewed 
as a stabilizing leader, Milosevic remained in power much to the dismay of the Serbian 
people, many of whom were resentful from the war. To maintain order, Milosevic 
tightened his grip on dissenters and turned his attention to marginalizing Albanians in 
Kosovo, perhaps as a means to maintain public support among the Serbs. The situation in 
Kosovo quickly escalated as the KLA began to demand rights and Milosevic brutally 
retaliated against them.141  Policymakers also expressed concern that violence in Kosovo 
would undermine implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement.142     
C. NATIONAL INTEREST: ESTABLISHING THE THREAT 
The executive branch viewed stabilizing relations between Serbia and Kosovo as 
a priority of national interest from the beginning. As early as 1992, President George H. 
W. Bush identified the region as a hotspot in the infamous “Christmas Warning” when he 
stated that military action was warranted if Serbia ever initiated conflict in Kosovo. A 
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year later, President Clinton reinforced the same statement.143  Months prior to the 
NATO air campaign in March 1999, officials began sending the message to Congress that 
Kosovo was a national interest beyond humanitarian necessity. First, conflict in Kosovo 
jeopardized the progress that had already been made in Bosnia and the ongoing 
implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. Second, the potential existed for the entire 
region to destabilize. Large refugee flows into already fragile neighboring countries such 
as Albania and Macedonia could extend the conflict as far Greece and Turkey. Third, it 
was in U.S. interest to reinforce democracy and human rights in the Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY). Lastly, NATO’s credibility as an instrument of European security 
needed to be upheld.144 
Executive branch officials repeated the same national interests in various 
congressional hearings continuously up through the Rambouillet negotiations. Despite the 
fact that intervention in some form seemed inevitable by mid-March, a meeting of the 
House Armed Services Committee convened on March 17, 1999 to discuss if sending 
ground troops to Kosovo supported national security interest. Some in Congress believed 
military operations in the Balkans served no value to U.S. security, consumed valuable 
resources, was not worth the risk to life, and inhibited ability to fight “real” wars should 
the need arise.145  Once more, U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Walter 
Slocombe, outlined to the committee the “calculated cold-blooded national interests” 
aside from the humanitarian crisis at stake in Kosovo.146   Most notably, he pointed to the 
situation in Kosovo as a crisis for European security in which NATO must maintain its 
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relevance. As an instrument of preserving European peace, NATO’s failure to intervene 
in Kosovo would undermine its very principles.147   
Some questioned whether intervention in Kosovo was outside of NATO’s 
intended purpose as a defensive alliance.148  A week prior, Henry Kissinger told 
Congress that introducing forces was “an unprecedented extension of NATO 
authority.”149    The rebuttal given by Slocombe and General Clark provided justification 
for why intervention was within NATO purview despite its beginnings as a defensive 
policy tool. Slocombe’s broad interpretation of Article V of the NATO treaty was that 
collective security was not confined to the security of the physical borders of its 
members, but also included protecting an intangible atmosphere of security in the 
region.150  Clark spoke to the transformation of NATO throughout the past decade 
describing how the security requirements of its members forever changed after the 
collapse of the USSR and how adapting to the new strategic environment would be 
necessary to sustain credibility. He cited NATO’s 1993 denial of flight operations 
supporting the UN in Bosnia and the recently established Partnership for Peace program, 
which provides consultation on security threats to non-NATO members in order to 
demonstrate the expansion of NATO’s mission.151  Clark also testified to the fact that the 
process of NATO enlargement from Western to Eastern Europe was a vital interest. 
NATO was a force multiplier in Europe and provided critical access to bases, which was 
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essential to the U.S. ability to fight two simultaneous theater wars. NATO provided the 
U.S. leverage on security issues.152  Former ambassador to the UN and well-known 
Georgetown professor, Jeane Kirkpatrick, told Congress NATO’s credibility was in 
jeopardy and “lines that were so clear during the cold war have simply been washed 
away.”153   
The national interest debate in Congress over Kosovo was significant for post-
Cold War politics because NATO intervention strayed from international norms. Clinton 
did not need congressional approval to send troops to Kosovo; however, his policymakers 
were obligated to frame the national interests at stake. The “national interest” debate 
helped rally Congress, but it was not the decisive factor in the intervention. Kosovo was 
dubbed by some as “Clinton’s War” because the executive branch took the lead as the 
situation unfolded.  
Several events led up to the point of no return for Milosevic and left the Clinton 
administration no choice but to move forward with the use of force. Regardless of those 
opposed in Congress, the Clinton administration had already embarked on a campaign of 
systematic coercive diplomacy using the international community to their advantage and 
with Holbrooke as the poster man. The executive branch powered the decision-making 
and diplomatic process. The first attempt for a diplomatic solution was through the 
Contact Group, which began working with Milosevic in February 1998.154   The 
international community, represented by the UN, repeatedly warned Milosevic by issuing 
UNSC resolutions 1160 and 1199. Neither of these resolutions threatened force, but they 
enabled NATO to threaten force if Serbia did not comply with them.155  By June 1998, 
NATO planning included military actions to stabilize the region. In July 1998, Congress 
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was informed that although diplomacy was the preferred policy tool, NATO planning 
included a military option in Kosovo. Slocombe stated, “A decision to initiate NATO air 
action depends on whether diplomatic efforts fail to achieve positive results.”156    
The most critical part of the U.S. decision-making process on intervention took 
place from October 1998 through March 1999. After threatening NATO air strikes in 
October 1998, Holbrooke brokered an agreement with Milosevic to allow the Kosovo 
Verification Mission (KVM), to hold elections in Kosovo, and to comply with UN 
resolutions. The KVM deployed to Kosovo, but Milosevic continued to be difficult, and 
clashes between Serbian police and the KLA continued. January 15, 1999 became a 
turning point in the diplomatic process. Serbian forces massacred 45 Albanians from the 
town of Racak; the massacre received international attention. As a result, the Contact 
Group summoned Serbian and KLA officials to the negotiating table. The Rambouillet 
peace conference convened February 6, 1999.157  The Clinton administration and military 
planners were prepared to use force depending on the outcome at Rambouillet. This 
conference was the last out for Milosevic, and refusing an agreement would back him 
into a corner. In reference to the peace negotiations, Kissinger said, “We are winking at 
the Albanians and saying, if you accept this, we will bomb the Serbs for you.”158  On 
March 22, 1999, the U.S. sent Holbrooke in a last minute effort to allow Milosevic a way 
out.159  The U.S. had expended all necessary means to meet its objectives in Serbia, and 
Milosevic did not demonstrate commitment to an end in violence on multiple occasions. 
The Clinton administration’s clear cut coercive diplomatic process and 
preparatory statements to Congress had laid the foundation for armed intervention by the 
end of March 1999. National interest and moral imperative were also conveyed to the 
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American public prior to the intervention. Upon the commencement of airstrikes, 
President Clinton stated to the nation, “We act to protect thousands of innocent 
people…we act to prevent a wider war…we act to stand united with our allies for 
peace.”160   Language such as this serves to inform the public and policymakers how 
intervention aligns with national interest and how it meets the moral criteria for 
humanitarian intervention. 
 In his autobiography, Clinton restated the objectives of the NATO intervention, 
“The bombing campaign had three objectives: to show Milosevic we were serious about 
stopping another round of ethnic cleansing, to deter an even bloodier offensive against 
innocent civilians in Kosovo, and, if Milosevic didn’t throw in the towel soon, to 
seriously damage the Serb’s military capacity.”161  Clinton had first articulated these 
same objectives in his speech to the nation on March 24, 1999, the first day of air strikes, 
and also emphasized the necessity to “demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s 
purpose.”162  As with most engagements after Somalia, Clinton explained that the 
humanitarian intervention would not consist of boots on the ground to arouse public 
support.163 
Some claim policymakers utilized PDD-25 as a tool to avoid intervention in 
Rwanda, but for Kosovo, Clinton made sure to articulate how intervention aligned with 
the terms of the directive. Although PDD-25 does not discuss collaboration with NATO 
in depth, it provides insight into the Clinton administration’s perspective on peace 
enforcement operations. Clinton’s March 1999 speech explains how the PDD-25 
intervention criteria aligned with objectives of OAF. The following themes are present in 
both PDD-25 and policymaker rhetoric leading up to OAF: national interest, moral 
imperative, risk to forces, consequences of inaction, partnership with allies, and 
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probability of spreading regional conflict.164   Prior to the intervention, the executive 
branch had constructed both national interest and moral imperative and conveyed them to 
both Congress and the public.  
The use of the term genocide was less of an issue in Kosovo than it had been in 
Rwanda. Debate over the word was less problematic because the U.S. was going into 
Kosovo regardless after the diplomatic situation unfolded. Employing the term 
“genocide” would not have been a decisive factor in the U.S. decision for intervention, 
while in Rwanda the term genocide accompanied legal obligation to intervene in a 
situation that was not of national interest. The State Department authorized incidental use 
of the word genocide in phrases such as “indicators of genocide” ten days into the 
engagement.165 The use of the term was less relevant for this humanitarian intervention, 
and most likely officials had learned from blatantly denying the term to the media over 
Rwanda.  
D. CRITICS OF KOSOVO 
Critics of U.S. objectives in the Balkans found other underlying reasons for U.S. 
intervention. Russia believed the U.S. was simply trying to expand NATO power. 
Russia’s Prime Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, turned his plane around while mid-route for 
a U.S. visit when Vice President Al Gore notified him of NATO air strikes.166 Noam 
Chomsky, classifies the U.S. and its Western partners as “enlightened states.”167 He 
points out the double standard that allows western states to violate sovereignty for 
humanitarian purposes, but prevents states not falling into the enlightened category from 
doing the same.168   Other critics blamed the U.S. for exacerbating the refugee issue and 
causing civilian casualties by bombing.169  Counter to this argument, the Office of the 
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United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that 
approximately 100,000 Albanians were displaced and approximately 135,000 had fled to 
other countries by the end of 1998. Shortly after their refusal to negotiate at Rambouillet, 
Serbians began ramping up attacks on Kosovars, and the UNHCR estimated 9,000 
individuals were displaced in Kosovo over the course of two days.170 Journalist Tariq Ali 
calls Kosovo an “act of triumphant imperialism.”171  Another perspective contends that 
the U.S. intentionally planned to transition NATO from a defensive alliance to a peace 
enforcement entity in order to challenge other European security efforts.172  One more 
suggested ulterior motive was that the U.S. needed to boost its military-industrial 
complex.173   
Most critics argue that Kosovo was all about NATO and nothing to do with 
humanitarianism. Humanitarianism was present, but by far the only consideration for 
intervention. NATO and U.S. credibility was at stake. NATO and the U.S. had already 
failed to follow through with its threat of air strikes in October 1998, and so it was left 
with no choice but to follow through on its second threat of air strikes after the failure of 
Rambouillet peace talks.   
Supporters of U.S. intervention in Kosovo address some of these critics by 
providing evidence that Milosevic gave every indication that he intended to continue 
down the path of repressing ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. If nothing had been done, more 
Albanians could have lost their lives. Beginning in 1989, Milosevic removed Kosovo’s 
autonomy and expanded the Serbian police presence. Serbian propaganda accused ethnic 
Albanians of targeting ethnic Serbs. In the winter preceding OAF, the Serbs killed 3,000 
Albanians and ousted approximately 300,000 from their homes in response to KLA 
attacks. Forty-five Albanians from the town of Racak were deliberately executed in 
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January 1999.174   Repeatedly, Milosevic failed to be transparent with negotiators and 
diplomats, specifically demonstrated by the interaction with Holbrooke.175   Milosevic 
refused entry into Kosovo for UN war crimes investigators seeking to inspect both 
Serbian and Albanian crimes. Seven months of negotiations, from September 1998 to 
March 1999, demonstrated U.S. and NATO resolve to find a diplomatic solution before 
resorting to air strikes.176  Most telling, Milosevic had already set a precedent for ethnic 
cleansing just a few years earlier in Bosnia.   
E. MEDIA: ESTABLISHING THE MORAL IMPERATIVE 
Approximately 2,200 more journalists covered the war in Kosovo than in 
Vietnam.177   Powerful media coverage shaped the perspectives of the American public 
and controlled the conceptualization of the war in the Balkans. Rapidly advancing 
communications technology extended the reach from governments to citizens through 
media coverage. Kosovo was unique because the media strategy was extremely 
coordinated amongst the NATO alliance.   This strategy was systematic and controlled to 
ensure the appropriate message was channeled through reporters hanging around NATO 
headquarters.178   Robert Lichter, president of the Center for Media and Public Affairs in 
DC, said, “To sell a war in a democracy when you’re not attacked, you have to demonise 
the leader or show that there are humanitarian reasons for going in.”179  Going as far to 
equate the U.S. to a totalitarian state, Chomsky, a longtime critic of mainstream media 
and wartime propaganda, believed Kosovo news was exaggerated to mobilize public 
support to overshadow the government’s weak case for using force.180  On the other 
hand, some reporters became personally attached to the cause. Journalists who had 
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covered the Srebrenica incident just a few years earlier set out on a personal mission to 
prevent another tragedy in Kosovo.181    
News coverage of the developing situation in Kosovo served to inform the world, 
but also justify NATO intervention.   Justification for NATO intervention came across as 
a moral imperative and humanitarian initiative.   Governments achieved the humanitarian 
check in the box by encouraging the broadcast of atrocity stories: “NATO needed 
evidence of ethnic cleansing and Serbian atrocity to convince the alliance of the moral 
rectitude of its humanitarian war and each ghastly murder, rape, act of pillage or arson 
that could be attributed to the Serbs helped demonise them.”182  Tariq Ali called this 
“atrocity news management (ANM).”183 Equally accountable as the NATO 
spokespersons channeling biased information, CNN has been accused of broadcasting 
only one side of the story. News coverage failed to address legality and sovereignty 
concerns. Instead, it focused on Serb atrocities, glamorized military technology like the 
Tomahawk missile, and branded the KLA as freedom fighters.184   In the media’s eyes, 
the gray areas often accompanied by civil wars were nonexistent. Serbs were bad and 
Kosovars were good; there was no in between.185  This type of reporting shaped the 
opinions of audiences and support for the intervention.   
Holocaust analogies were a common tactic to mobilize public opinion for 
humanitarian intervention. Part of the media’s justification included portraying Milosevic 
as an evil villain and comparing him to Hitler.186   Milosevic was not only the perpetrator 
of mass murder, his typical modus operandi, as seen first-hand by Holbrooke, was to 
make promises to Western leaders to keep them out of his territory in the same way Hitler 
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once did.187 This tactic seemed practical; especially since the Balkans were the first 
region to experience noticeable ethnic cleansing in Europe since WWII.188  Clinton drew 
parallels to the Holocaust in his speech to the nation on the first day of OAF, implying 
that the U.S. turned its head the other way during the Holocaust and that would not be 
allowed to happen again.189   
F. SUMMARY 
A few characteristics make Kosovo stand out from the other case studies in this 
examination. The first is that this humanitarian intervention was planned in advance as a 
means to further U.S. strategic interest. The Clinton administration kept force as an 
option on the table from the beginning. The executive was engaged in a well-thought out 
process of coercive diplomacy far in advance of intervention. Coercive diplomacy 
culminated at the actual decision point to intervene, which took place after Milosevic’s 
failure to respond to Rambouillet. The coercive escalation strategy was appropriate 
considering the background of the situation. Milosevic had been a thorn in the Clinton 
administration’s shoe for quite some time and history had shown that he would continue 
on the path he was on. The second characteristic, which makes Kosovo unique, is the use 
of the media as means of applying pressure to policymakers and as an outlet for 
policymakers to make their case to audiences. NATO learned how to use the media to its 
advantage. The media role was more significant in this case study than the other two.  
The most important factors tipping the scale toward intervention in this case are 
Kosovo’s proximity to Europe, upholding NATO’s credibility in providing European 
security, and Milosevic’s history. Also assisting the decision was the fact that the U.S. 
had the air capability to conduct the intervention with minimal risk of casualties and 
political pressure from inaction in Rwanda and Bosnia earlier in the decade.   
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Lastly, NATO intervention in Kosovo was the first of its kind, and served as an 
example of success for future policy actions. The U.S. led NATO in an intervention that 
had not been sanctioned by the UN. This was the first NATO operation that was 
offensive in nature. Twelve years later, NATO’s air campaign in Libya shared some 
similarities.   
 47 
IV. LIBYA 
The UN Security Council press statement on Libya issued February 22, 2011 
urged the Libyan government to live up to its “responsibility to protect its population.”190   
Intervention in Libya came more than a decade after Kosovo. Since Kosovo and other 
interventions of the 1990s, the international community continued to debate the concept 
of humanitarian intervention and some attempted to normalize it through the concept of 
responsibility to protect (R2P). For the U.S., two factors remained consistent in its 
humanitarian interventions since Kosovo. That is the presence of national interest and a 
moral imperative in U.S. operations. President Obama addressed the nation as the U.S. 
led Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya transitioned to NATO control:  “Mindful of the 
risks and costs of military action, we are naturally reluctant to use force to solve the 
world’s many challenges. But when our interests and values are at stake, we have a 
responsibility to act. That’s what happened in Libya over the course of these last few 
weeks.”191   
This case study begins with a brief background on the uprising in Libya, an 
explanation of the relevant U.S. foreign policy picture at the time, and an analysis of the 
specific factors that influenced the U.S. decision-making process leading up to the 
commencement of Operation Odyssey Dawn on March 19, 2011. This chapter outlines 
the U.S. strategic interests at stake and the moral imperative that led to intervention in 
Libya. Supporting evidence shows that most U.S. policymakers, especially DOD 
officials, were initially opposed to intervention, but then changed course after a 
combination of developments within the international community and in Libya. Unlike 
Kosovo, which had the full attention of the Clinton administration months in advance, 
Libya was a last minute strategic choice following a turn of events over a short time 
period. Critical events in the timeline leading up to intervention include the rapid 
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issuance of UNSCR 1973 under Chapter VII authorization, blatant threats and supporting 
action from Muammar Qaddafi to destroy his own people, pressure from allies to act, 
Arab League support, and indifference from major state actors such as Russia and China. 
Some congressional proceedings leading up to the use of force are still classified; 
however, available proceedings and literature show the Obama administration saw 
intervention as an opportunity and led the push for U.S. involvement. Intervention in 
Libya became an option after the unsuspecting alignment of the critical events listed 
above and of ideals, interests and capabilities.192  The tipping point in the direction of 
intervention took place on March 15 after Obama met with his advisors and decided to 
pursue a UN resolution that would legitimize the U.S. use of force against Qaddafi’s 
forces in Libya. The end of this chapter discusses Libya’s possible implications for the 
future and introduces humanitarian intervention under the construct of R2P.   
A. BACKGROUND 
Libya was not as important to the U.S. as other Arab nations like Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia, but it held some strategic significance because it had a history of state sponsored 
terrorism, nuclear aspirations, and initiating anti-West coalitions with other Arab nations. 
U.S. relations with Libya began to improve in 2003 when it dismantled its nuclear 
program and Qaddafi formed relationships with his neighbors across the Mediterranean. 
By 2010, the U.S. had trade and defense agreements with Libya and a routine of 
diplomacy. Despite these advances, Libya still repressed its own people. Disappearances 
of Qaddafi regime opposition were commonplace.193  
Protests in Libya began mid-February 2011 amidst the Arab Spring taking place 
in two of its neighboring countries. January 2011 marked the ousting Tunisia’s president 
and the beginning of protests against Mubarak’s regime in Egypt. The protests in Libya 
escalated into full-scale rebellion with clashes between Qaddafi’s forces, mostly based in 
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Tripoli, and opposition protestors, mainly in Benghazi.194  Qaddafi openly threatened a 
cleansing of his opposition, calling them “greasy rats.”195  Rebels formed the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) on February 27 and took over Misrata, the third-largest city. 
Historical precedence and Qaddafi’s public threats established the credible expectation 
that he would use his more advanced military capabilities, including air assets, against the 
rebels and possibly civilians.   On March 6, Qaddafi initiated a counter-offensive to quell 
the rebellion, gain back territory taken by rebel forces, and advance toward Benghazi.196  
His army had already and was preparing to launch attacks on heavily populated urban 
areas.197 By March 13, Qaddafi’s forces had regained ground against the rebels and 
continued to push toward rebel-held Benghazi.198  With Benghazi’s impending doom, the 
U.S. and the international community were at a decision point.199  
The UNSC passed resolution 1970 on February 26 freezing assets and 
establishing an arms embargo. Three weeks later UNSCR 1973 established a no-fly zone 
in Libyan air space and authorized member states to use “all necessary measures…to 
protect civilians” under Chapter VII.200 This phrase would empower the U.S. and its 
allies to conduct an extended intervention in Libya under NATO control, which 
ultimately led to regime change. Contrary to previous U.S. interventions such as Kosovo, 
a UNSCR mandate initiated operations by calling for a no-fly zone. Two days later, the 
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U.S. commenced Operation Odyssey Dawn. NATO, largely led by France and Britain, 
assumed control of the intervention 11 days after it began. Later, operations became 
controversial because some thought the continuation of operations led by NATO 
exceeded the intent of the UNSCR.201  
B. CONTEXTUAL FACTORS 
This case study is the first to take place in the post-9/11 world order. Although the 
intervention in Libya was not direct operations in support of the branded “Global War on 
Terror,” this contextual factor is still worth noting. After 2001, U.S. foreign policy 
actions were largely justified in countering al-Qaeda and terrorism. This allowed 
policymakers to frame the intervention as a national interest because it would deter the 
type of environment in which al-Qaeda could thrive.202  Additionally, the American 
public may not have discerned the intervention in Libya from other anti-terror campaigns 
in the Middle East.   
The Arab Spring is another contextual factor weighing on the Libyan intervention. 
Dealing with the Arab Spring from a political and eventually military perspective was a 
balancing act for the U.S. Protests were simultaneously occurring in Egypt, Tunisia, 
Yemen, Bahrain, and Jordan. Despite the repressive governance of the region, the U.S. 
maintained strategic relationships in the Middle East both because of energy resources 
and to build partnerships for countering Islamic extremism and Iran.203  The Arab Spring 
required the U.S. to navigate cautiously through the uprisings in the Middle East so that it 
could support the spread of democratic values while also hoping for Western friendly 
follow-on regimes and continuing partners in the fight against terrorism.204  The manner 
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in which the U.S. responded to Libya had the potential to affect its relationships with key 
partners in the Middle East such as Egypt and Bahrain. If the U.S. allowed Qaddafi to 
move forward on Benghazi, the signal sent to other repressive governments is that it is 
acceptable to unleash the military on civilians. On the other hand, interference came with 
the unintended consequence of offending current relationships in Africa and the Middle 
East, if nations perceived the U.S. as overstepping its reach. Lastly, any perception of 
U.S. sponsorship of the Arab Spring could ultimately jeopardize interests in the region 
and relationships with new regimes resulting from the Arab Spring.205  For this reason, 
the endorsement of the Arab League eventually became a critical factor in the U.S. 
decision for intervention. 
The Obama administration was in the process of drawing down from 
engagements in the Middle East and public opinion supported less involvement there.206 
U.S. and its allies’ involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq throughout the previous decade 
are also important considerations within the Libya context. Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran 
were still on the foreign policy agenda and higher up than Libya.207  U.S. involvement in 
Libya could be, and later was, construed as another mission of regime change similar to 
Iraq. American public opinion was low from a decade of deployments to the Middle East, 
and a lot of money had been spent on operations there.208  Operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan had become complicated and surfaced the realization that killing the enemy 
didn’t always allow for political objectives to be met.209  Furthermore, The U.S. and 
NATO allies were still feeling the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis and defense 
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budgets declined as a result.210 Also of note, action in Libya came just a few months 
prior to Obama’s announcement on a shift in strategic focus towards Asia.211  
C. CIRCUMSTANCES FOR INTERVENTION  
Several factors were instrumental in tipping the Obama administration in the 
direction of intervention.   These factors include Qaddafi’s imminent threat to the urban 
population of Benghazi, Arab League support for a no-fly zone, pressure from Britain 
and France, the prompt release of UNSCR 1973 with Chapter VII authorization, and 
indifference from major state actors such as Russia and China. First, Qaddafi was an 
imminent threat to his people. From the onset of the rebellion, he issued threats of 
forthcoming violence towards his people through the government newspaper and national 
television. The death toll was estimated at approximately 2,000 by the beginning of 
March and refugees flowed into Tunisia and Egypt.212 Qaddafi refused to comply with 
the first UN resolution. He began a military campaign to regain ground he had lost to the 
rebels using tanks, artillery, and air strikes.213  As Qaddafi’s troops marched toward 
Benghazi, the Obama administration had every reason to believe he was going to follow 
through with the threats on the people. If Qaddafi reached Benghazi, the estimated death 
toll was predicted at 100,000.214 Pressure to act built up before he unleashed his military 
on opposition and civilians. 
Second, the Arab League supported intervention. By March 12, the U.S. was still 
undecided about what to do in Libya, but official Arab League support for a no-fly zone 
added another reason to intervene. Of note, comments from Secretary of Defense, Robert 
Gates, and the official White House statement implied that the Obama administration was 
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still deliberating over what action to take despite the Arab League vote.215  However, 
Arab League support was undoubtedly a driving force, possibly the most important 
influence, in pressuring the international community and Obama to act. The Arab League 
had not asked for Western intervention on another Arab League nation before. 
Additionally, Bahrain was another strategic issue, which was evolving simultaneously 
with Libya, for both the U.S. and the Arab League. Saudi Arabia and the UAE helped 
Bahrain contain its protests, while the U.S. remained silent because of its interests there. 
The league disliked Qaddafi and saw Libya as a separate issue from Bahrain. Arab 
support meant the U.S. was free to act and opened up an opportunity to enhance U.S. 
reputation in the region. It added momentum to the U.S. discussion on what to do.216     
Third, France and Britain pressured Obama to act. The French President, Nicolas 
Sarkozy, and Britain’s Prime Minister, David Cameron, were more forthcoming in their 
rhetoric about a no-fly zone and intervention than Obama. France and Britain led the 
charge for intervention; they had their own set economic and security concerns to act 
upon. France recognized the NTC as an official body within Libya before anyone else. 
They sent a joint letter to the European Union (EU) calling for the removal of Qaddafi 
and the start of NATO planning. With France and Britain rallying the rest of Europe, the 
U.S. was in a position to make an impact with a fairly low cost in resources.217 Sarkozy 
and Cameron also facilitated UNSCR 1973 in partnership with Lebanon.218 NATO began 
discussions on Libya February 25, but made no serious plans. NATO intervention was 
unwelcome by the Arab world, and its role remained unclear while Britain and France, 
and later the U.S., did the heavy lifting.219   
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Lastly, Russia and China abstained from voting on UNSCR 1973. On March 15, 
Obama asked UN Ambassador Susan Rice to push for a more aggressive resolution at the 
UN.220  The UN adopted resolution 1973 on March 17. It was significant because it 
authorized member states to use force and established a no-fly zone. By Keohane’s 
definition, the intervention would be considered an authorized one because of the Chapter 
VII resolution.221 In a departure from norms, both Russia and China abstained in the vote 
rather than veto. Both nations routinely supported sovereignty over intervention.222  
Russia had minimal interests in Libya and its focus was on entering the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Later, Russia’s military and economic ties with Syria would 
contribute to nonintervention there. Through their abstention in the vote, Russia and 
China demonstrated subtle support for the situation.223 
D. THE INTERNAL DEBATE 
The bulk of the U.S. decision-making process took place mid-February through 
Mid-March of 2011. When the situation first unfolded, policymakers did not want to get 
involved.224 Up until a few days before operations began, Secretary of State, Hillary 
Clinton, was telling European allies that the U.S. would not intervene.225  Moral 
imperative to stop the slaughter of civilians in Benghazi combined with the strategic 
interests in a critical geopolitical region caused those at the top to reconsider quickly, 
especially in light of the recent international support.226   
The DOD was skeptical of intervention. Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen raised valid concerns about objectives. If the goal was to 
stop Qaddafi from murdering his people, more than simply a no-fly zone would be 
needed. The U.S. needed to conduct direct air strikes on Qaddafi’s forces in hopes of 
                                                 
220 Chivvis, Toppling Qaddafi, 59.  
221 Keohane, “Introduction,” 1.  
222 Engelbrekt, “Why Libya?” 51.  
223 Chivvis, Toppling Qaddafi, 60–61.  
224 Engelbrekt, “Why Libya?” 49. 
225 Chivvis, Toppling Qaddafi, 55.  
226 Engelbrekt, “Why Libya?” 49. 
 55 
deterring them from moving forward.227 Gates opposed military action in Libya because 
of possible unintended consequences that accompanied regime change or lack thereof in 
Libya. He believed the political objectives in Libya were unclear, an information gap 
existed about the capabilities of the rebels, attacking another Muslim country could hurt 
U.S. reputation, and U.S. resources needed to be spent on higher priority operations. 
James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, also warned that Libya could 
become a broken country after intervention.228 
Some in the Obama administration sided with Gates, while others argued for 
intervention. Remaining veterans from the Clinton administration still used the Balkans 
and Rwanda in considerations on humanitarian intervention. Rice was one of the Clinton 
era advocates that led the argument for intervention. She believed using force to help 
Muslims would help U.S. reputation in the region. Samantha Power, the National 
Security Council (NSC) Director for Multilateral Affairs, provided Obama with a full 
range of options, but personally favored intervention.229  A Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) report also indicated that Obama entertained a full range of options 
throughout the crisis; he was not set on a specific policy action in the beginning.230 
The U.S. supported the ousting of Qaddafi, but opposed its own involvement in 
military intervention until approximately March 15 after Obama had spoken with 
Secretary Clinton, who supported intervention, and he met with his NSC.231  Images of 
Qaddafi’s forces closing in on Benghazi to murder his own people made the decision 
urgent and established the moral justification for intervention. The new development of 
Arab support removed some of the previous reservations held by those opposing 
intervention. Strategically, the U.S. could not be seen sitting on the sidelines as the 
international community engaged, especially at the risk of appearing too inhibited by Iraq 
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and Afghanistan.232  Additionally, this was an opportunity for the U.S. to deter other 
leaders in the region from doing the same.233 Obama had personally kept the Libya 
debate open in the preceding weeks. With the impending humanitarian crisis and amount 
of international support, Obama directed Rice on March 15 to pursue a bold UN 
resolution that would permit the U.S. to conduct air strikes on Qaddafi’s forces.234  This 
was the tipping point towards humanitarian intervention. 
1. Congress 
Congressional documents leading up to the commencement of air strikes on 
March 19 are largely classified. Support for a humanitarian intervention varied in 
Congress. Congress voted to support a no-fly zone on March 1, and the Obama 
administration consulted Congress the day before it began strikes in Libya.235 Some 
members believed strategic interests were at stake, while others believed the Obama had 
stepped out of his lane to conduct a military operation with unclear objectives. Once air 
strikes began, the debate in Congress centered on when to end the mission or how to hand 
it over to NATO.   
Those in Congress who opposed intervention argued that national interest was not 
at stake. They claimed Obama had exceeded his authority as Commander-in-Chief by 
expending resources with no clear objectives. Instead, involvement in Libya risked 
unintended consequences and the same mission creep that had occurred in Afghanistan. It 
would further strain the U.S. military already engaged in two other Middle East 
operations and could undermine the existing commitments of European allies 
participating in those operations.236  Intervention in Libya did not contribute to the 
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overall foreign policy picture in the Middle East. Additionally, those against intervention 
believed the U.S. and its partners lacked clarity on whether the intervention aimed for 
regime change and also what the follow on political military arrangement would be for 
the opposition. UN resolution 1973 had not called for regime change.237   
Those members of Congress whom supported the Obama administration argued 
the case for intervention by outlining U.S. strategic interests. The U.S. “role as an anchor 
of global security and advocate for human freedom,” was called a national interest.238 
Participation in the multilateral effort would positively impact stability in North Africa 
and the Middle East by countering extremism. Libya could ultimately be a win for U.S. 
foreign policy in the long term.239  The humanitarian threat was imminent based upon 
Qaddafi’s track record and blatant language. If left unchecked, a humanitarian disaster 
beginning with an attack on Benghazi would have unfolded. A humanitarian disaster in 
Libya could disrupt the ongoing transitions in Tunisia and Egypt, the democratic 
ambitions in the region, and encourage other repressive regimes to use violence in order 
to maintain power. Furthermore, the U.S. had a vital interest in facilitating the credibility 
of the UN and its role to promote global security.240   
Early in the crisis, Senators John McCain and Joe Lieberman argued for the 
ousting of Qaddafi in order to prevent a lengthy civil war and humanitarian disaster. They 
argued if Libya became a failed state, it could become a safe haven for violent extremists.   
Failure to act sends the wrong message to other repressive regimes that it is acceptable to 
use violence to suppress peaceful protests. Both senators believed the combination of 
humanitarian and strategic situations required intervention: “The United States must not 
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be passive at this critical moment in history. From Bosnia to Rwanda, we know that the 
international community has in the past been too slow to react to situations like the one 
unfolding in Libya – with awful and unspeakable costs in human life. For both moral and 
strategic reasons, we must not repeat this mistake.”241   
E. MISSION IN TRANSITION 
The transition of Operation Odyssey Dawn to NATO’s Operation Unified 
Protector on March 31 was controversial. NATO had initiated military planning in 
February, but its role in the operation was unclear as the U.S. began hostilities and after 
the UN resolution escalated the situation with a Chapter VII resolution. The spectrum of 
conflict was moving farther away from what NATO thought would be its original 
involvement of evacuation and humanitarian operations. The Arab League did not want 
NATO involved, France feared undermining Arab support, Germany opposed the 
intervention from the beginning, and Turkey voiced its skepticism over Western 
motives.242  Allowing NATO to lead a military operation in Africa would set a new 
precedent, but it wouldn’t be the first time the Alliance acted outside of its physical 
borders on behalf of European security.  
 Both the U.S. and Britain supported a NATO takeover for legitimacy purposes 
and because it had experience doing similar operations. Eventually, a smaller coalition 
within NATO evolved and did most of the work. Those in disagreement sat on the 
sidelines, but still voiced support so as to appear unified. NATO assumed the U.S. would 
maintain its level of military commitment from the beginning, but the U.S. insisted on 
sharing the burden.243 The level of U.S. commitment diverged from the role it had played 
in previous peace enforcement operations.   
Debate over whether NATO’s Operation Unified Protector exceeded UNSCR 
1973 surfaced. Some thought operations should be strictly defensive, limited to 
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protecting civilians and maintaining rebel held positions. Others saw the NATO operation 
as an offensive war of regime change that stepped out of bounds. Obama and Cameron 
had voiced for the removal of Qaddafi, but regime change as a military action was a side 
effect of the operation.244 Jeffrey Michaels claims that NATO’s success is often 
attributed to the regime change and that “a coalition under the auspices of the Alliance 
was able to transform the mission from a defensive to an offensive one, albeit with the 
silent approval of reluctant members.”245 The objective was to stop Qaddafi’s forces 
from killing civilians and if Qaddafi happened to fall during U.S. or NATO intervention, 
all the better.   
The transition to NATO is important to examine because the shift required Obama 
to substantiate the extent of U.S. involvement in Libya for a second time; this time for the 
NATO operation. Ivo Daalder, U.S. ambassador to NATO, headed the diplomatic effort 
to transition the intervention to NATO. Obama addressed the nation on March 28 to 
inform the American people that the U.S. had accomplished its goals and focused its 
“unique capabilities on the front end of the operation.”246 Now, the U.S. would transfer 
responsibilities to NATO. He made a point to emphasize that the U.S. would play a 
supporting role “including intelligence, logistical support, search and rescue assistance, 
and capabilities to jam regime communications.”247 
F. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
Initial military objectives were met by the intervening coalition. They maintained 
an arms embargo, created and maintained a no-fly zone, and helped protect Libya’s 
population. The effects of Libya are still unfolding and so the accomplishment of political 
objectives is more difficult to measure. One of the major strategic reasons for 
intervention was to set an example to other regimes that might repress their populations 
among the Arab Spring. This is also difficult to measure, but it is possible that Assad took 
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the intervention in Libya into his calculations as he repressed his population.248  
Additionally, the intervention was less costly than the previous NATO air campaign in 
Kosovo.249   
The intervention in Libya had implications for the future, and some of its effects 
are yet to be measured. U.S. analysts thought the Arab Spring undermined the jihadist 
narrative. On the contrary, al-Qaeda thought the unrest worked to the group’s advantage. 
Looking at the present situation in Libya, extremist groups have been able to exploit the 
Libyan chaos by training fighters there and claiming weapons from abandoned caches. 
Gartenstein-Ross classifies the NATO intervention in Libya as a “strategic setback” 
because of its unintended consequences.250  The beheadings of 21 Egyptians by the 
Islamic State in Libya serve as the most current evidence of Islamic extremists exploiting 
the disorganization there.  
NATO was able to claim Libya a success. The intervention served as a much 
needed ego boost for NATO, which had experienced recent setbacks. Participation in 
Afghanistan and Iraq raised differences amongst the allies and proved costly at a time 
when defense budgets were strained. The Alliance had also grown in members, and so 
taking the lead on any military operations demonstrated it could overcome internal 
disagreements. Despite these hurdles, the intervention in Libya reassured NATO and 
external audiences that it was still capable of conducting a successful military operation 
and acting as an instrument of the UNSC.251 
Lessons learned from other interventions, to include Kosovo, impacted the 
concept of operations for Libya. Historically, the U.S. preferred to be in full command of 
peace enforcement operations involving U.S. troops as noted in PDD-25252  Unlike the 
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NATO intervention in Kosovo, the U.S. pressured partner nations such as France and 
Britain to bear a heavier burden. Policymakers wanted the U.S. military role to be 
limited.253  Obama spoke about cutting costs and sharing the burden in his address to the 
nation.254 The U.S. took a “lead from behind approach,” asking its allied partners to carry 
most of the weight.255   Sharing the burden was a model that diverged from previous U.S. 
missions. Those who believed the U.S. should have taken a more active role claim the 
lack of U.S. participation in NATO’s Operation Unified Protector sent a signal that it 
would be okay if allies sit the next one out.256   
In keeping with the trend in U.S. interventions, Obama kept his promise to the 
American public that the intervention in Libya would be conducted without putting 
troops on the ground and achieving objectives through air power.257  Both the preference 
for air power and sharing the burden in Libya could have implications on future 
operations and will most likely continue to be seen in U.S. strategic decisions.258 The 
current U.S. fight against the Islamic State has been one from the air and employing the 
help of allies. Also, the U.S. has taken a back seat in the current negotiations between 
Russia and Ukraine most likely in an attempt to empower European allies to take more 
responsibility. This form of limited intervention helps keep both political risks and 
taxpayer costs low for the U.S.259 
Neither the U.S. nor NATO engaged in post-conflict planning for Libya. The 
intention of the intervention was not one of nation building. Libya is unique because 
there was no post-intervention plan for continued peacekeeping operations, training of 
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forces, or advising the new government.260 The intervention in Libya was somewhat of a 
last minute decision, and the U.S. wanted to keep its involvement extremely limited. The 
reason for the lack of post-conflict engagement might be attributed to an overall pull back 
after disjointed nation building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, conservation of resources, 
or a policy shift toward spreading the burden more evenly.   
G. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT  
The UN has been fine tuning the concept of R2P since its acceptance at the World 
Summit in 2005. After the inconsistent response to humanitarian crises throughout the 
1990s, Gareth Evans spearheaded the concept in 2000 during the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). His purpose was to develop 
a norm with specific criteria, which clearly outlined the global community’s right to 
intervene in certain humanitarian circumstances, how and when intervention should 
occur, and by whose authority.261  Although the concept in name was adopted by the UN 
and appears in several resolutions, it is not officially codified.262  R2P when requiring the 
use of force is exercised through issuance of a Chapter VII UNSCR; however, powerful 
nations may use it in their justification to meet their own interests. Libya is considered by 
some, not all, as an example of R2P in action. 
 Whether Libya is a successful example of R2P is debatable. Supporters praised 
Libya as a R2P success story and claimed that it marked a shift in UNSC outlook.263 
Others such as Tom Keating argue that the abstentions of Russia, China, India, Brazil, 
and Germany for UNSCR 1973 reflect strategic interests and are not the result of a more 
amicable outlook towards R2P. As the implementation of UNSCR 1973 shifted to 
NATO, these nations became more concerned that the intervention was outside of 
NATO’s lane and focused on removing the Qaddafi regime rather than saving 
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civilians.264  David Rieff’s New York Times article “R2P, R.I.P” claims the subsequent 
air support for the rebellion “has done grave, possibly even irreparable, damage to R2P’s 
prospects of becoming a global norm.”265 He claims Western states used R2P to justify 
their policy of regime change and extension of NATO’s mission in Libya beyond 
protecting civilians. These skeptics claim the abuse of R2P in Libya turned Russia and 
China off towards any possibility of UN intervention in Syria.266  However, Russia’s 
relationship with Syria would’ve precluded them from supporting a UNSCR regardless of 
their thoughts on Libya. Christopher Chivvis counters Rieff’s stance by saying Russia 
and China will continue to block intervention for their own purposes and not because 
they feel NATO used R2P as an excuse for regime change in Libya. There is little 
evidence to suggest NATO’s intention was to mislead other nations by employing the 
construct of R2P.267 
H. SUMMARY 
The U.S. intervened in Libya due to a last minute alignment of the stars. The 
tipping point toward intervention occurred March 15, only four days before air strikes 
began. Intervention was a last minute strategic choice of Obama’s inner circle that was 
made possible by Arab League support, UN authorization, pressure from France and 
Britain, indifference from Russia and China, and a clear moral imperative. Libya’s 
location, interest from the international community, and the larger context of the Arab 
Spring made this a strategic situation that the U.S. believed it could use to their 
advantage.   
It is yet to be seen, but expected that this intervention will have implications for 
future U.S. and NATO interventions. Obama’s insistence on sharing the burden and the 
lack of post-conflict planning may mark a larger shift in foreign policy on humanitarian 
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interventions. The intervention also has implications for NATO. This was the second 
time NATO led a military operation to implement a UNSCR outside of its physical 
region. Some are still debating whether NATO’s Operation Unified Protector should be 
considered a success or failure. The effects of this intervention are still revealing 
themselves as shown by the unintended chaos that has surfaced in Libya.    
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V. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis was to understand how the U.S. makes the case to 
intervene or refrain from humanitarian intervention in the Post-Cold War era. This 
examination of humanitarian intervention reviewed the foreign policy context and debate 
within the U.S. government across three case studies: Rwanda, Kosovo, and Libya. Each 
case study revealed the role of national interest and moral imperative in driving 
policymakers to the tipping point at which they made the final determination to use or 
refrain from military force. Both national interest and the desire to end human suffering 
are incentives for intervention and one may be stronger than the other in any given 
situation. In some cases neither may be strong enough to warrant military force.268   
Humanitarian intervention in Rwanda was never a policy option for the U.S. due 
to the lack of national interest. Moral outrage in the public and the media was not strong 
enough to pressure the Clinton administration to take action. It became very difficult for 
U.S. decision makers to constitute a strategic interest in Africa after the 1993 events in 
Somalia. Therefore, the tipping point in the direction of nonintervention occurred after 
U.S. involvement in Somalia.  
Kosovo is a clear demonstration of the U.S. decision process on humanitarian 
intervention when strategic interests are involved. Unlike Rwanda, the Clinton 
administration engaged in a year-long strategy of coercive diplomacy culminating in a 
NATO led humanitarian intervention. This was a purposeful intervention to serve U.S. 
interests. The media served as a valuable tool for policymakers to convey national 
interest and moral imperative to domestic and international audiences. The tipping point 
in the direction of intervention was determined by the outcome of the February 1999 
peace negotiations at the Rambouillet conference.  
Libya was a by-chance intervention in which a strategic opportunity presented 
itself to the U.S. after a spontaneous series of events. Several factors enabled the U.S. to 
take action without risking reputation damage in the international community. 
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Policymakers had to convey to the public and Congress how intervention in Libya served 
as vital interest, although none was overly apparent.269  The moral imperative to act in 
Libya was time sensitive, so explaining it as a national interest was a fairly 
unencumbering task. The tipping point toward intervention in Libya took place March 15, 
just four days before the U.S. began air strikes, when President Obama made the decision 
to push for a robust UNSCR that would empower the U.S. to use all necessary means to 
stop Qaddafi.  
There are two broad conclusions that can be drawn from this study. The first is 
that the U.S. decision-making process in humanitarian interventions is contingent upon so 
many factors that each case must be viewed in the context of its unique circumstances. 
Developing a consistent norm or framework of criteria that applies to all humanitarian 
interventions is nearly impossible because of this. The second is that U.S. involvement in 
interventions almost always centers on a strategic interest and is never strictly 
humanitarian. Kissinger and Baker refer to this as “pragmatic idealism.”270  
The R2P concept evolved from the humanitarian crises of the 1990s and some 
equate it to humanitarian intervention renamed. Considering this study, it is unlikely that 
R2P will ever become codified by the international community in the future because each 
case of humanitarian intervention is dependent upon the strategic interests of 
stakeholders. Robert Murray captures this idea well by arguing “the strategic calculations 
states make remain largely unaltered by the rise of human security and its most prominent 
manifestation, R2P.”271 
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